The paper considers tacit collusion in markets which are not fully transparent on both sides. Consumers only detect prices with some probability before deciding which …rm to purchase from, and each …rm only detects the other …rm's price with some probability. Increasing transparency on the producer side facilitates collusion, while it increasing transparency on the consumer side makes collusion more di¢ cult. Conditions are given under which increases in a common factor, a¤ect-ing transparency positively on both sides, are pro-competitive. With two standard information technologies, this is so, when …rms are easier to inform than consumers.
industrial end-users, see O¢ cial Journal (1990) . While consumers previously had to exert considerable e¤ort to compare prices in many markets such comparisons are now often avaliable with a click on the mouse. It is often suggested that consumer or government agencies should counter weak competition by setting up price comparison sites and thus improve transparency on the consumer side of the market. For instance, the Danish National Consumer Agency (a government agency) hosts price comparison pages for banks, cellphones, natural gas, and home utilities (see http://www.forbrug.dk/test/priser/). Evidently, such facilities may also be used by …rms. It is an interesting, and so far unresolved issue, whether an increase in price transparency a¤ecting both sides of the market at the same time is to be considered pro-competitive. This paper seeks to make some headway on this issue.
Improved transparency on the producer side is mostly viewed as anticompetitive since it is thought to facilitate tacit collusion, see for instance, Stigler (1964) , Green-Porter, (1984) , Tirole (1988) , Kühn and Vives (1995) and Kühn (2001) . Transparency on the consumer side is thought to have opposite e¤ects. Here the arguments usually refer to a static setting, building on results of the search literature of the 80'ies like Varian (1980) , Stahl (1989) , Burdett and Judd (1983) and many others. An exeption is Schultz (2005) , where I show that in a di¤erentiated Hotelling market improved transparency on the consumer side makes tacit collusion more di¢ cult, while it has (almost) no e¤ect if the market is almost homogeneous. The present paper investigates the e¤ects on tacit collusion from a change of a common factor increasing transparency on both sides of the market. In the homogeneous market, the e¤ect is anti-competitive, since only the producer side matters. In a di¤erentiated market, however, this is not so. In general, the result depends on the relative elasticities of transparency wrt the common factor on either side. However, for two of the most widely used information technologies in the literature -a simple concave technology and the model of Butters (1977) and Grossmann-Shapiro (1984) -the result is unambigous.
In a su¢ cently di¤erentiated market, if …rms are easier to inform than consumers, an increase in a common factor promoting transparency on both sides is pro-competitive. Although perhaps surprising at …rst sight, the reason is intuitive: When …rms are easier to inform, they are relatively well informed. Hence, increases in price transparency a¤ects the more poorly informed consumer side relatively more, and this is the crucial issue.
Hence, from a competition policy perspective the results of this paper points to that in homogeneous markets, competition authorities (and consumer agencies) should not try to further price transparency. Price transparency only a¤ect competition through the producer side, and this e¤ect is anti-competitive. In (su¢ ciently) di¤ erentiated markets, the relation is di¤erent. Here both producer and consumer side e¤ects are relevant and they counter each other. Under standard assumptions on information proliferation, the consumer side e¤ects dominate and measures which increase transparency on both sides are likely to be pro-competitive.
We assume that a consumer learns prices with a given probability less than one. Hence, only a fraction of consumers will be informed about prices as in Varian (1980) . We identify transparency on the consumer side with the fraction of informed consumers. Similarly, on the producer side, …rms learn each others'prices with some probability only. Since market demand is stochastic, this implies that in a collusive equilibrium, a …rm only learns that another …rm has deviated with some probability. We study trigger strategy equilibria where a punishment is only initiated if a …rm learns that the other …rm has deviated. Firms'collusive strategies thus involve price-monotoring schemes for the competitiors. These equilibria have the virtue that they are simple and they accord well with the evidence from many cartel cases. It is well known that implicit cartels may also rely punishment phases initiated when demand conditions turned out to be su¢ ciently bleak, i.e where …rms employ sales monotoring schemes. While such startegies are intellectually appealing, it appears that the more simple strategies considered here are in fact used by many of the cartels we know of. Furthermore, diseminating information about members pricing and sales has traditionally been core business for established cartels, so that deviations from adhering to the collusion cannot go undetected. Such behavior is consistent with trigger strategies based on observed deviations from collusion.
Market transparency has been analyzed in various ways in the literature.
An early contribution is Varian (1980) who studies a homogeneous market where some consumers are unaware of prices. In this setting the …rms'expected prices and pro…ts decrease in the level of market transparency. The search literature, see for instance Burdett and Judd (1993) prices she is indi¤erent between buying from either …rm if she is located at
A fraction of the consumers are informed about both …rms' prices, while the rest are uninformed. An uninformed consumer cannot learn prices by visiting both …rms, she can only visit one …rm in a period. The …rms'locations are known to all consumers. The variable is our measure of market transparency at the consumer side. Both information types of consumers are uniformly distributed on locations. An uninformed consumer has an expectation p e i of …rm i 0 s price. If she is located y away from …rm i; her expected utility from buying one unit from i is u p e i ty: She is indi¤erent between buying from the two …rms, if she is located at x(p e 0 ; p e 1 ). In a period, the time line is as follows: First s realises and it is not observed by …rms. Then …rms set prices, which are observed by some consumers only, the rest form expectations. Consumers decide on which …rm to go to -if any. If an uninformed consumer arrives at a …rm and …nds that the price is higher than expected, she may decline to buy. Finally, transactions take place.
We will assume that the fraction of informed consumers is su¢ ciently high such that
this will imply that the market is covered in a pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
We will focus on symmetric equilibria where p e 0 = p e 1 = p e . As will become clear, the equilibrium price will be so low (at most u t=2) that all consumers buy and each …rm faces (1 ) =2 uninformed consumers. The number of consumers visiting …rm 0 can therefore be written without explict reference to the expected prices as Under (2) the monopoly price, p m ; is given as p m = u t=2:
3 One period equilibrium
The one period Nash equilibrium may be in pure or mixed strategies depending on the degree of product di¤erentiation relative to the maximal willingness to pay, t=u; and the transparency of the market, . We …rst consider the case where the equilibrium is in pure strategies.
Each …rm chooses the price to maximize the expected pro…t taking as given the other …rm's price. In a symmetric equilibrium, the …rms set the same price, serve both informed and uninformed consumers, and the relevant part of the demand function is given by the second line in (3). The Nash equilibrium price, p N ; and expected pro…t, N ; are
An increase in consumer transparency, ; increases competition and lowers the Nash-equilibrium price and pro…t. When …rms choose prices, they take into account that a price decrease is only noticed by the informed consumers.
An increase in consumer transparency makes demand more elastic and competition more intense. In the one shot game the …rms therefore -jointly have no interest in promoting consumer transparency. It is straightforward to check that the second order condition for maximum is ful…lled. 1 When the Nash equilibrium is in pure strategies, then
is a measure of the relative gains to …rms from monpoly pricing relative to competitive pricing. Evidently, the gain is a function of u; t and : We can rewrite condition (2) as
When goods are close substitutes, p N = t= becomes very low and will not be an equilibrium price since it becomes a better option for a …rm to raise its price to the monopoly price p m = u t=2 and only sell to the (1 ) =2
uninformed consumers who visit the …rm 2 : This gives higher pro…t than p N if the degree of product di¤erentiation is so low that
When (5) is ful…lled, product di¤erentiation is so low that a pure strategy equilibrium does not exist. Varian (1980) shows that in a homogeneous market where a fraction of the consumers are uninformed, there are no pure strategy Nash equilibria, but a symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium exists. The same happens in the Hotelling model, when the goods become close substitutes. Schultz (2005) characterizes the symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium. The characterization does not allow closed form solutions, but it is shown (in Lemma 1) that as the transport cost t tends to zero; the limiting expected pro…t of each …rm is 3
1 In deriving the equilibrium we assumed that the market is covered and the second line of (3) is relevant, hence it should not be advantageous to undercut the other …rm by t and gain the whole informed market. This takes that
; which is ful…lled for all positive and t: Under assumption (2) the market is covered in the Nash equilibrium. 2 If the …rm decides to sell only to a fraction of the uninformed consumers arriving, the best price solves maxp 0 (1 )
: For small t;
the best choice is p0 = u t 2
3 Since no confusion should be possible, we abuse notation slightly by using N to indicate the expected pro…t in the pure as well as in the mixed strategy equilibrium.
The result is intuitive: It is always an option for a …rm to charge the reservation price, which equals u when transportation costs vanish, and only serve the uninformed consumers arriving. In a mixed strategy equilibrium, each price in the support of the distribution must give same expected pro…t, and hence the expected pro…t is given by (6) . When goods are almost homogeneous, the market works as if …rms extract almost all possible rent from the uninformed consumers and none from the informed. A similar result was obtained by Varian for the homogeneous market. In Schultz (2005) it is also shown that
4 Tacit Collusion
Now we consider the repeated game. There are in…nitely many periods, = 0; :::; 1: In each period the market is as described above. The size of the market s di¤ers over periods, we assume that s is drawn from the distribution independently over the periods. Firms seek to maximize the discounted sum of expected pro…ts and both have the discount factor ; which ful…lls 0 < < 1: We will assume that a consumer's information type (as well as her location) is the same in all periods.
So far we have concentrated on market transparency on the consumer side. Whether …rms can observe each others'prices ex post is not important for the one period analysis but it is for the dynamic analysis. We will identify transparency on the producer side with the probability that a …rm observes the other …rm's price. Let this probability be ; where 0 < 1: We will assume that if a …rm observes the other …rm's price, then it is common knowledge. It may, for instance, be the case that the price is put on an internet side run by an independent consumer agency known to both …rms, news papers may cite the price, or they are both aware that a person has disclosed the information. It may also be the case that the …rms deliberately have made an arrangement for sharing of information as many cartels have in fact done.
The fact that …rms may not observe each others' price can a¤ect the possibility of maintaining tacit collusion. If …rms collude on a high price, a …rm may deviate in a period to a lower price and the other …rm may not see it, but its sales will be a¤ected. However, since the market demand is stochastic this lowering in sales may also be due to slack demand. We will focus on trigger strategy equilibria where punishment phases are only initiated when …rms observe a deviation. Here transparency on the producer side will have a direct e¤ect.
As is well known, Green and Porter (1984) show that even though …rms do not observe each others strategic variables, they may nevertheless collude relying on punishment phases which are initiated after periods of very slack demand. One could of course also conceive of such equilibria in our model, but we will not consider this extension here. The strategies we con- We focus on a trigger-strategy equilibrium, where in the collusive phase, …rms collude on the best possible price, either the monopoly price, p m = u t=2 or some lower price. Observed deviations from collusion are punished with reversion to the one-shot Nash equilibrium for the rest of the game as suggested by Friedman (1971) . Collusion on the price p can be sustained if the present value of collusive pro…ts exceeds the expected pro…t from a deviation plus the present value of the expected continuation pro…t after a deviation. With probability the deviation is observed and the continuation pro…t equals the present value of receiving Nash pro…ts in all future. With probability 1 the deviation is not observed and the continuation pro…ts equal the present value of expected collusive pro…ts. Letting N denote the expected pro…ts of the Nash equilibrium (whether in mixed or pure strategies) the non-deviation constraint therefore becomes
When …rms collude on p; their expected pro…t is (p) = p=2 in all periods.
If a …rm deviates to a lower price, only informed consumers learn this before they visit the …rm. The uninformed expect the …rm to set p and half of them will visit the …rm and get a nice surprise. The other half go to the other …rm and will not observe the deviation. The optimal deviation price is
The …rst expression in (9) applies when the optimal deviation does not capture the whole market. The deviation pro…t is
Both expressions are increasing in when p > t= : Hence, more can potentially be gained from a deviation when the market is more transparent on the consumer side.
then d (p m ) is given by the …rst expression in (10) otherwise it is given by the second.
Di¤erentiated markets
We now consider the case where product di¤erentiation is relatively high so that (5) is not ful…lled and the one shot Nash equilibrium is in pure strategies.
Inserting the relevant expressions, we …nd that the non-deviation constraint for full collusion on the monopoly price (8) is ful…lled when …rms are su¢ ciently patient, namely when
Clearly, 0 <^ < 1: The …rst expression in (12) applies when the optimal deviation does not capture the whole market. Straightforward di¤erentia-tion gives that^ is increasing in the level of market transparency at the consumer side, ; (since depends positively on ) and decreasing in the level of market transparency on the producer side, ; regardless of whether 7 2 . More consumer transparency makes collusion more di¢ cult, while more producer transparency makes it easier. Increasing transparency on the consumer side has two e¤ects, a deviation becomes more pro…table, but the ensuing punishment becomes harder as well. On balance, the …rst effect is the larger and therefore collusion becomes more di¢ cult. Increasing transparency on the producer side makes it more likely that a deviation is detected, and this makes a deviation less pro…table, thus collusion becomes eaiser.
The condition, 2 ; is ful…lled for all if u=t < 5=2 and ful…lled for 1= (u=t 5=2) : In both cases, the extra pro…t from a large reduction in price is su¢ ciently small, that the optimal deviation does not capture the whole market. As is clear the condition is ful…lled for all if the transportation cost, t; re ‡ecting the degree of product di¤erentiation or "pickiness" of the consumers is su¢ ciently large.
Suppose then that the discount factor is lower than the crucial discount factor,^ : In this case, it is not possible for the …rms to sustain full collusion on the monopoly price and the most favorable equilibrium from the point of view of the …rms involves a collusive price which exactly makes the non-deviation constraint (8) ful…lled. This gives
Clearly, p c (and the associated pro…t) is decreasing in transparency on the consumer side and increasing in transparency on the producer side. Again the …rst line relates to the case where the optimal deviation does not capture the whole market.
Summing up these results we have Proposition 1 Suppose product di¤ erentiation is high, so (5) is not ful…lled. The lowest discount factor compatible with full collusion on the monopoly price is given by (12) . It increases in consumer side transparency and decreases in producer side transparency. If the discount factor is so low that full collusion is impossible, then the highest price the …rms are able to collude on is given by (13) . It decreases in consumer side transparency and increases in producer side transparency. 
Let e.g. e ; @ ( ) @ .
( ) be the elasticity of wrt : Then
The decisive feature is the elasticities and not the levels of transparency on the two sides. An increase in the common factor is pro-competitive if the elasticity of wrt is su¢ ciently large relative to the elasticity of wrt : The crucial cut o¤ value depends on the gains from collusion and the transparency on the consumer side. When 2 ; so the optimal deviation does not capture the whole market (cf, (11)), it is a su¢ cient condition for ful…lling the the condition that the consumer side elasticity is larger than the producer side elasticity.
If full collusion on the monopoly price cannot be sustained, then e¤ect on the best collusive price, p c ; from an increase in the common factor is dp
Again, an increase in the common factor is pro-competive if the consumer side elasticity is su¢ ciently higher than producer side elasticity.
Proposition 2 Suppose product di¤ erentiation is high, so (5) is not ful-
…lled. An increase in a common factor increasing transparency on both sides of the market, increases the lowest discount factor compatible with full collusion if is su¢ ciently more elastic than wrt ; so that (14) is ful…lled. If the discount factor is so low that full collusion is impossible, then an increase in lowers the collusive price if is su¢ cently more elastic than wrt , so that (15) 
is ful…lled
When a common factor a¤ects transparency on both sides, the competitive e¤ect hinges on on which side of the market information spreads more easily, as measured by the relevant elasticities. Evidently, this depends on how information spreads -i.e. on the information technology. Suppose a consumer agency spends resources informing market participants about prices. We will now consider how this a¤ects the market under two simple well known information technologies.
Suppose for example that the amount of money spent by some agency informing market participants constitutes the common factor . The agency could be a government agency, a consumer agency or some other organization or entity. Suppose further that the probability the …rms are informed about prices is increasing in the amounts spent and given by the concave function 5
where h > 0 represents the costliness of increasing the chance the …rms learn the prices, and 0 re ‡ect that even if the consumer agency spends no resources, there will be some chance the …rms learn each others'prices. If …rms are easily informed, h is low, while the opposite is the case if h is high.
The elasticity of wrt then becomes :
Suppose, similarly that the probability a consumer is informed is given by the same kind of technology, but the costliness, f > 0; of informing a consumer may be di¤erent. The fraction of informed consumers is then
Hence, e ; e ; = h f
i¤ f > h; i.e. if …rms are less costly to inform. Suppose 2 ; (which is ful…lled if u t 5 2 < 1) so that an optimal deviation captures the whole market. From (14) and (15) we then have that more resources spent by the consumer agency on information for sure is pro-competitive if f > h. If 2 ; then relative elasticity has to be less than a cut o¤ value below one, and f has to be su¢ ciently much larger than h:
As an other example, consider Grossman and Shapiro's (1984) information technology (based on Butter (1977)). Here ads are placed in magazines.
A given magazine's readership is the fraction r of the population. This equals the probabilty a consumer reads a given magazine. Furthermore, it is assumed that the probability that a given consumer sees an ad in one magazine is independent of the probability that she sees an ad in another magazine; that is, di¤erent magazines have independent readerships. Then if the agency places ads in magazines, the probability that a given consumer will see none of these ads is (1 r) . To avoid the special case, where the probability a consumer is informed is zero in the absence of the agency, we assume that there will be one magazine informing about prices even if the agency does not. To simplify, assume this magazine is not used by the agency. Hence the probability a consumer does not learn about prices is
(1 r) +1 : Conversely, the probability she does learn about prices is there-
The elasticity of wrt is then
Di¤erentiating, we …nd
As 0 < r < 1; this is negative if
which is indeed true as ln 1 = 0; ln 0 (1) = 1; and ln 00 (x) < 0. Hence e ; is decreasing in r:
Suppose that the probability a …rm reads a given magazine is z: Then the probability that the …rm is informed is ( ) = 1 (1 z) +1 and e ; is given by (18) with r replaced by z: If …rms spend more resources than a consumer on collecting information, i.e. are more likely to read a given magazine than a consumer, then z > r; and since the elasticities are decreasing in r and z;
we have e ; > e ; :
Hence, if …rms spend more ressources than consumers in achieving information, so that z > r, they are more likely to be informed and provided 2 then (14) and (15) are ful…lled and an increased e¤ort by the consumer agency is pro-competitive. Again if 2 ; z has to be su¢ ciently much larger than r; for this to be the case.
Hence, for both considered information technologies, if …rms are easier to inform and therefore better informed than consumers about prices (in the probabilistic sense), a larger e¤ort by the agency informing the market is for sure pro-competitive if the market is su¢ ciently di¤erentiated (such that the …rst lines in (14) and (15) are relevant). If the market is less di¤erentiated, then the condition for this pro-competitive outcome is more stringent, then …rms have to be su¢ ciently much more informed.
Summing up :
Proposition 3 Suppose product di¤ erentiation is high, so (5) is not ful…lled. Consider an increase in a common factor a¤ ecting transparency on both sides of the market, and 2 . If the information techonogy is given by (16) or by (17) then a marginal increase in is pro-competitive (both in terms of lowering the crucial discount factor for full collusion, and in lowering the best price …rms can collude on if full collusion is impossible)
if it is easier to inform …rms, i.e. f < h or r < z: If < 2 the same is true if f ( r) is su¢ ciently smaller than h (z):
These results may appear counter-intuitive at …rst: If …rms are more easy to inform, one could imagine that an increase in information is anticompetitive as transparency will be higher on the producer side. The crucial feature, however, is that the elasticities matter. If …rms are easier to inform, they are better informed from the outset and an increase in information will have relatively less impact on the producer side of the market.
6 Almost homogeneous markets Schultz (2005) showed that in the almost homogeneous market changes in transparency on the consumer side do not a¤ect the scope for tacit collusion.
Changes in price transparency therefore only a¤ects competition through the producer side and since this e¤ect is anti-competitive, the total e¤ect is anti-competitive. For the sake of completeness, we derive the relevant crucial discunt factor here, when producer side transparency is included in the model. When product di¤erentiation is very low (5) is ful…lled, the Nash equilibrium is in mixed strategies, and the optimal deviation price is given by the second part of the expression (9) . The lowest discount factor compatible with full collusion is (using (8))
Clearly, @ =@ < 0; so an increase in makes collusion easier if indeed it is feasible. The e¤ect of an increase in is
Unfortunately, the sign of @ @ cannot directly be assessed for all relevant t as we have no closed form solution for E N : In the limit, as t ! 0; we get, using (6) and (7), 
When product di¤erentiation is very low, the crucial discount factor allowing collusion on the monopoly price is independent of ; the transparency of the consumer side. The reason is that in such a market, a …rm which deviates by undercutting the other …rm wil capture the whole informed part of the market, and earn the monopoly pro…t from this part of the market. The punishment (which is initiated with probability ) consists of loosing the …rm's half share in monopoly pro…t from the informed part (as can be seen from (6)). Transparency on the consumer side, ; changes the size of the informed market, but not the relation between the whole or the half of this part. Therefore has no e¤ect on the no-deviation constraint. An increase in producer transparency, ; still facilitates collusion, since this increases the chance that the …rm is punished for a deviation. Evidently, this implies that if a common factor a¤ects transparency on both sides of the market, then the e¤ect is unambigously anti-competitive.
Concluding remarks
Homogeneous and di¤erentiated markets di¤er with respect to how one shoud assess the virtues of measures promoting price transparency that may a¤ect both sides of the market. We have shown that in a homogeneous market, only the producer side e¤ect matters and this e¤ect is anti-competitive.
In such markets, competition agencies or consumer agencies should not promote price transparency. In di¤erentiated markets, however, the issue is more complicated. In the simple di¤erentiated Hotelling market, the e¤ects steming from the two sides counter each other. Under standard assumptions about information proliferation, the consumer side e¤ect dominates and in such markets measures promoting price transparency are pro-competitive.
The positive e¤ects of the consumer side dominate over the negative e¤ects of the producer side. Evidently, the better the measures can be targeted to the consumer side the better it is from a competition perspective. This may be hard, though. The results of this paper is somewhat relieving in this respect.
